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The	  Futility	  of	  Cost	  Benefit	  Analysis	  in	  Financial	  Disclosure	  Regulation	  
	  




What	  would	  happen	  if	  cost	  benefit	  analysis	  were	  applied	  to	  disclosure	  
regulations?	   	  Mandated	  disclosure	  has	   largely	  escaped	   rigorous	  CBA	  
because	   it	   looks	   so	  plausible:	   	  Disclosure	   seems	   rich	   in	  benefits	   and	  
low	  in	  cost.	   	  This	  article	  makes	  two	  arguments.	  First,	   it	  previews	  our	  
thesis	  in	  More	  Than	  You	  Wanted	  to	  Know	  (Princeton	  Press,	  2014)	  that	  
disclosure	   laws	   do	   not	   deliver	   their	   anticipated	   benefits	   and	   thus	  
could	  not	  easily	  pass	  quantified	  CBA.	  Second,	  it	  describes	  a	  previously	  
unrecognized	   cost	   of	   disclosure,	   one	   arising	   from	   lawmakers’	  
collective	  action	  problem.	  With	  the	  proliferation	  of	  disclosures,	  each	  
new	   mandate	   diminishes	   the	   attention	   people	   can	   give	   to	   other	  
information,	   including	   all	   other	   disclosures.	   The	   problem	   for	   CBA	   is	  
lawmakers’	   inability	   to	   coordinate	   laws	   across	   different	   fields	   and	  
jurisdictions.	   The	   article	   illustrates	   this	   regulatory	   failure	   by	  
examining	   the	   rigorous	   cost-­‐effectiveness	   analysis	   conducted	  by	   the	  
Consumer	   Financial	   Protection	   Bureau	   in	   its	   recent	   mortgage	  




Mandated	  disclosure	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  common	  regulatory	  techniques	  in	  
American	  law.	  	  	  It	  has	  been	  the	  principal	  regulatory	  answer	  to	  some	  of	  the	  principal	  
policy	  questions	  of	  recent	  decades,	  nowhere	  more	  prominently	  than	  in	  financial	  
regulation.	  Financial	  crashes	  and	  crises	  breed	  new	  disclosure	  laws,	  from	  the	  Securities	  
Act	  of	  1933,	  the	  Truth-­‐in-­‐Lending	  laws	  of	  the	  60s	  and	  70s,	  Sarbanes-­‐Oxley	  in	  2002,	  and	  
most	  recently	  the	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  Act.	  In	  regulating	  investment	  markets,	  the	  law	  mandates	  
disclosure	  of	  firm-­‐specific	  information	  to	  investors.	  And	  in	  regulating	  credit	  markets,	  the	  
law	  mandates	  a	  thicket	  of	  disclosure	  about	  loans’	  terms	  and	  risks.	  
	  
Disclosure	  is	  lawmakers’	  favorite	  technique	  not	  only	  in	  financial	  regulation,	  but	  
ubiquitously.	  	  Vast	  stretches	  of	  consumer-­‐protection	  law	  mandate	  disclosures.	  	  Health	  
law	  abounds	  in	  disclosures	  –	  in	  informed	  consent,	  health-­‐care	  plans,	  insurance,	  drug	  
labeling,	  and	  research	  regulation.	  Privacy	  law,	  campaign	  finance	  law,	  conflicts	  of	  interest	  
regulation,	  and	  a	  long	  list	  of	  product-­‐specific	  laws	  require	  sophisticated	  parties	  to	  give	  
information	  to	  help	  people	  make	  better	  choices.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
*	  University	  of	  Chicago	  and	  University	  of	  Michigan,	  respectively.	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Almost	  as	  striking	  as	  mandated	  disclosure’s	  ubiquity	  is	  the	  absence	  of	  evidence	  
that	  its	  benefits	  outweigh	  its	  costs.	  	  Even	  though	  government	  agencies	  routinely	  analyze	  
costs	  and	  benefits	  when	  using	  other	  regulatory	  techniques,	  genuine	  analyses	  of	  
mandated	  disclosure’s	  costs	  and	  benefits	  are	  rare,	  a	  fact	  that	  seems	  to	  leave	  lawmakers	  
unperturbed.	  	  Nor	  have	  scholars	  thirsted	  to	  take	  on	  the	  work	  of	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis.	  
True,	  many	  studies	  investigating	  how	  well	  disclosees	  understand	  particular	  disclosures	  
and	  how	  well	  changing	  disclosures	  improve	  understanding.	  	  Occasionally	  studies	  ask	  
whether	  disclosures	  actually	  lead	  people	  to	  better	  choices	  in	  real,	  non-­‐laboratory,	  
settings.	  	  Few	  studies	  investigate	  the	  costs	  of	  disclosure	  mandates,	  and	  fewer	  still	  (if	  any)	  
make	  a	  full-­‐throated	  inquiry	  into	  whether	  benefits	  outweigh	  costs.1	  	  	  
	  
	   While	  disclosure	  regulation	  has	  largely	  escaped	  the	  rigor	  of	  quantitative	  cost	  
benefit	  analysis,	  informal	  analysis	  is	  largely	  positive.	  	  By	  “informal”	  we	  mean	  approaches	  
that	  recognize	  the	  presence	  of	  costs	  and	  benefits	  and	  acknowledge	  that	  regulation’s	  
benefits	  ought	  to	  exceed	  its	  costs	  but	  do	  not	  actually	  try	  to	  measure	  whether	  they	  do.	  	  	  
	  
	   How	  can	  mandated	  disclosure	  flourish	  as	  a	  regulatory	  device	  without	  
“comprehensive	  estimates	  of	  the	  expected	  benefits	  and	  costs	  to	  society	  based	  on	  
established	  definitions	  and	  practices	  for	  program	  and	  policy	  evaluation?”2	  	  Partly	  
because	  the	  occasion	  for	  such	  comprehensive	  estimates	  often	  do	  not	  arise.	  	  Many	  
disclosure	  mandates	  –	  including	  disclosures	  about	  financial	  choices	  –	  are	  set	  by	  courts	  in	  
the	  common-­‐law	  manner.	  	  When	  a	  court	  declares	  that	  a	  failure	  to	  warn	  or	  disclose	  is	  
actionable,	  a	  new	  mandate	  is	  born.	  But	  courts	  are	  not	  asked	  to	  (and	  cannot)	  conduct	  
serious	  cost	  benefit	  analysis.	  	  They	  generally	  have	  information	  only	  about	  the	  case	  
before	  them	  and	  not	  about	  the	  larger	  problem,	  and	  their	  vision	  is	  easily	  distorted	  by	  
hindsight.	  	  
	  
Disclosure	  regulation	  flourishes	  in	  agencies’	  informal	  cost	  benefit	  analysis	  
because	  its	  benefits	  look	  obviously	  great,	  its	  costs	  obviously	  small.	  The	  benefits,	  while	  
hard	  to	  ascertain	  concretely,	  look	  substantial.	  Think	  about	  the	  benefit	  of	  warnings	  about	  
how	  to	  use	  a	  medication,	  or	  information	  about	  a	  loan’s	  price.	  	  These	  disclosures	  can	  
prevent	  serious	  injury	  or	  disastrous	  borrowing.	  They	  also	  spare	  uninformed	  patients	  or	  
borrowers	  the	  considerable	  expense	  of	  acquiring	  that	  knowledge	  in	  other	  less	  efficient	  
ways.	  Whatever	  the	  disclosure’s	  costs,	  the	  benefits	  seem	  orders	  of	  magnitude	  greater.	  
	  
Furthermore,	  those	  costs	  look	  puny,	  not	  only	  relative	  to	  the	  perceived	  benefits	  
but	  absolutely.	  	  Yes,	  firms	  and	  regulatory	  agencies	  must	  draft	  and	  distribute	  written	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  See	  John	  C.	  Coates	  IV,	  For	  and	  Against	  Cost-­‐Benefits	  Analysis	  of	  Financial	  Regulation,	  available	  at	  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2375396.	  
2	  The	  quoted	  standard	  is	  taken	  from	  the	  government’s	  circular	  laying	  out	  the	  requirement	  of	  
cost	  benefit	  analysis.	  See	  Guidelines	  and	  Discount	  Rates	  for	  Benefit-­‐Cost	  Analysis	  of	  Federal	  
Programs,	  Circular	  No.	  A-­‐94	  Revised,	  p.	  4	  (The	  White	  House	  Office	  of	  Management	  and	  Budget,	  
October	  29,	  1992).	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texts,	  often	  in	  predesigned	  and	  easily	  replicable	  formats,	  and	  this	  may	  require	  some	  
resources.	  But	  generally	  mandated	  disclosure	  makes	  few	  demands	  either	  on	  the	  fisc	  or	  
disclosers.	  It	  surely	  does	  not	  involve	  the	  kinds	  of	  costs	  that,	  say,	  drug	  approval	  or	  
environmental	  regulation	  wrestle	  with—lost	  lives	  and	  significant	  effects	  on	  the	  
regulated	  entity’s	  primary	  activities.	  	  	  
	  
And	  so	  informal	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  seems	  so	  obviously	  to	  favor	  disclosure	  that	  
disclosurites	  think	  systematic	  cost	  benefit	  analysis	  superfluous.	  (We	  use	  the	  term	  
“disclosurite”	  for	  those	  who	  favor	  mandated	  disclosure	  as	  a	  regulatory	  tool).	  	  Even	  if	  
lawmakers	  overestimate	  the	  benefits	  or	  underestimate	  the	  costs,	  the	  errors	  look	  
relatively	  harmless,	  for	  compared	  with	  other	  regulations	  the	  magnitude	  of	  effects	  is	  not	  
staggering.	  Mandated	  disclosure	  often	  requires	  disclosers	  to	  give	  information	  they	  
already	  have	  or	  can	  easily	  produce.	  The	  evidence	  that	  is	  therefore	  necessary	  to	  justify	  
regulatory	  action	  can	  be	  looser.	  And	  scaling	  back	  or	  expanding	  a	  poorly	  drafted	  mandate	  
looks	  easy.	  So	  most	  disclosure	  laws	  are	  enacted	  with	  weak	  opposition.	  	  Interest	  groups	  
oppose	  only	  the	  few	  disclosures	  that	  are	  framed	  as	  warnings	  (e.g.,	  GMO	  labeling,	  or	  
credit	  card	  “Minimum	  Payment	  Warning”.)	  Because	  interest	  groups	  rarely	  oppose	  
mandates	  of	  full-­‐disclosure,	  there	  is	  little	  systematic	  pressure	  to	  conduct	  cost-­‐benefit	  
accounts	  of	  a	  proposed	  mandate.	  
	  
But	  what	  if	  cost	  benefit	  analysis	  were	  taken	  seriously?	  Could	  it	  be	  done?	  	  	  What	  
would	  it	  show?	  	  These	  are	  of	  course	  questions	  too	  complex	  to	  be	  answered	  in	  a	  journal	  
article,	  since	  mandated	  disclosure’s	  effects	  depend	  on	  a	  long	  chain	  of	  fragile	  links.	  	  
Lawmakers	  must	  correctly	  identify	  a	  problem,	  gauge	  what	  disclosure	  to	  mandate,	  and	  
articulate	  the	  mandate	  correctly	  and	  comprehensibly.	  	  Disclosers	  must	  interpret	  
mandates	  correctly	  and	  provide	  information	  appropriately.	  	  Disclosees	  must	  locate,	  read,	  
understand,	  analyze,	  and	  apply	  disclosures	  effectively.	  	  Here,	  we	  will	  concentrate	  on	  
some	  of	  the	  problems	  law-­‐makers	  face,	  particularly	  some	  of	  the	  problems	  that	  have	  
been	  least	  recognized.	  
	  
We	  argue	  that	  were	  cost	  benefit	  analysis	  done	  methodically,	  only	  a	  diminutive	  
fraction	  of	  the	  thousands	  of	  disclosures	  now	  required	  would	  be	  mandated.	  	  For	  two	  
reasons.	  	  First,	  mandated	  disclosure’s	  proved	  benefits	  are	  significantly	  lower	  than	  often	  
assumed.	  	  Massive	  evidence	  points	  to	  this.	  The	  deluge	  of	  disclosures	  people	  receive,	  the	  
overload	  of	  data	  in	  disclosures,	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  issues	  disclosures	  try	  to	  explain,	  
and	  the	  effort,	  skill,	  and	  learning	  disclosees	  would	  need	  to	  use	  disclosures	  to	  make	  good	  
decisions	  all	  make	  it	  inconceivable	  that	  people	  will	  notice,	  read,	  understand,	  and	  use	  
mandated	  disclosures	  effectively.	  The	  unending	  effort	  to	  reform,	  improve,	  and	  simplify	  
financial	  disclosure	  is	  a	  testimony	  to	  how	  elusive	  the	  benefits	  have	  been.	  	  Intermediaries	  
and	  agents	  might	  read	  and	  interpret	  disclosures	  for	  consumers,	  but	  this	  conjecture	  is	  
contested	  even	  in	  securities	  markets	  and	  has	  no	  traction	  in	  retail	  credit	  markets.	  
	  
If	  the	  benefit	  of	  disclosure	  were	  vanishingly	  low,	  mandates	  would	  be	  undesirable	  
even	  if	  they	  cost	  little.	  	  But	  mandated	  disclosure’s	  costs	  are	  significantly	  greater	  than	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often	  supposed.	  	  We	  identify	  a	  cost	  of	  disclosure	  that	  has	  not	  been	  previously	  
articulated,	  and	  which	  is	  exceedingly	  unlikely	  to	  be	  captured	  even	  in	  systematic	  cost	  
benefit	  analysis.	  It	  is	  a	  cost	  that	  emerges	  from	  the	  way	  various	  disclosure	  mandates	  
interact	  with	  each	  other.	  We	  call	  it	  the	  “accumulation	  problem”	  and	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  a	  
fundamental	  problem	  with	  disclosure	  regulation	  that	  no	  single	  lawmaker	  can	  resolve.	  
	  
Our	  argument	  has	  two	  stages.	  We	  begin	  with	  the	  benefits	  of	  mandated	  
disclosure.	  We	  track	  the	  standard	  disclosurite	  logic	  that	  mandated	  disclosure	  has	  much	  
benefit	  and	  show	  that	  it	  conflicts	  with	  a	  vast	  array	  of	  findings	  in	  almost	  every	  kind	  of	  
mandate.	  	  Elsewhere,	  we	  explain	  why	  mandated	  disclosure’s	  benefits	  are	  quite	  small,	  so	  
we	  do	  not	  reproduce	  that	  argument	  in	  detail	  here.	  3	  Rather,	  we	  develop	  the	  second	  
stage	  of	  the	  argument,	  regarding	  the	  regime’s	  costs.	  Here,	  too,	  we	  track	  the	  disclosurite	  
logic	  that	  mandated	  disclosure	  is	  nearly	  costless.	  	  	  We	  then	  identify	  the	  cost	  that	  evades	  
even	  the	  most	  rigorous	  cost	  benefit	  analysis.	  	  When	  people	  receive	  numerous	  
disclosures,	  each	  new	  mandate	  expropriates	  some	  of	  the	  attention	  paid	  to	  other	  
disclosures.	  	  This	  is	  a	  cost	  that	  can	  offset	  the	  new	  disclosure’s	  benefit.	  	  We	  illustrate	  our	  
argument	  by	  examining	  a	  recent	  case	  in	  which	  an	  agency	  empirically	  tested	  a	  new	  
disclosure	  mandate	  thoroughly	  and	  concluded	  that	  it	  is	  beneficial,	  but	  failed	  to	  account	  
for	  the	  inter-­‐disclosure	  accumulation	  effect.	  We	  demonstrate	  that	  this	  overlooked	  cost	  
is	  likely	  to	  dwarf	  any	  perceived	  benefit	  that	  the	  agency	  hoped	  for.	  With	  our	  more	  
complete	  account	  of	  mandated	  disclosure’s	  costs	  we	  conclude	  that	  even	  disciplined	  
cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  of	  any	  specific	  disclosure	  regulation	  is	  likely	  to	  inspire	  false	  




A. The	  Allure	  of	  Mandated	  Disclosure:	  Many	  Benefits	  
	  
Mandated	  disclosure	  proliferates	  in	  financial	  regulation	  and	  elsewhere	  because	  
it	  seems	  so	  beneficial.	  	  	  	  Benefits	  are	  sometimes	  framed	  in	  non-­‐pecuniary,	  non-­‐economic	  
terms	  (e.g.,	  “autonomy,”	  the	  “right	  to	  know,”	  the	  “disinfectant”	  against	  corruption,	  or	  
educating	  consumers),	  but	  the	  perceived	  benefits	  have	  a	  strong	  foundation	  in	  welfare	  
economics:	  Informed	  people	  make	  better	  choices	  and	  fewer	  mistakes.	  	  Informed	  
markets	  compete	  and	  trade	  more	  efficiently	  and	  thus	  produce	  more	  surplus.	  
Disseminating	  information	  saves	  the	  duplicate	  searches	  and	  over-­‐caution	  uninformed	  
people	  tend	  toward.	  	  
	  
Information’s	  benefits	  are	  so	  well	  accepted	  that	  they	  are	  often	  assumed	  to	  
exceed	  mandates’	  costs.	  	  For	  example,	  consumer	  financial	  disclosures	  intend	  to	  produce	  
a	  concrete	  benefit	  –	  helping	  consumers	  choose	  financial	  products.	  	  But	  measuring	  this	  
benefit	  has	  been	  hard,	  leading	  Federal	  Reserve	  regulators,	  writing	  on	  truth-­‐in-­‐lending	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Omri	  Ben-­‐Shahar	  and	  Carl	  E.	  Schneider,	  More	  than	  You	  Wanted	  to	  Know:	  The	  Failure	  of	  
Mandated	  Disclosure	  (Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2014).	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laws,	  to	  concede	  that	  “it	  may	  not	  be	  possible	  to	  do	  much	  more	  than	  infer	  or	  assert	  that	  
disclosure	  requirements	  have	  probably	  had	  a	  favorable	  impact.	  For	  example,	  it	  may	  be	  
difficult	  to	  demonstrate	  conclusively	  that	  TILA	  had	  improved	  consumer’s	  ability	  to	  
match	  product	  and	  needs	  .	  .	  .	  .”	  	  But	  these	  regulators	  are	  undisturbed,	  because	  “it	  
certainly	  seems	  reasonable	  that	  more	  readily	  available	  information	  should	  do	  this.”4	  	  
	  
Disclosure’s	  benefits	  also	  seem	  so	  broad	  and	  many	  that	  specifying	  their	  size	  
seems	  almost	  petty.	  	  Instead	  of	  counting	  the	  magnitude	  of	  benefits,	  disclosurites	  count	  
the	  number	  of	  distinct	  benefits	  (and	  find	  no	  less	  than	  thirty-­‐eight	  social	  distinct	  
benefits).	  	  The	  long	  list	  of	  disclosure’s	  presumed	  benefits	  includes:	  improving	  
competition,	  driving	  out	  high	  cost	  producers,	  reducing	  corruption	  and	  exploitation,	  
increasing	  the	  competence	  of	  individual	  consumers’	  decisions,	  encouraging	  market	  
reforms,	  reducing	  wasteful	  information	  processing	  costs,	  improving	  saving/consumption	  
tradeoffs	  by	  consumers,	  and	  even	  enhancing	  economic	  stability.5	  	  
	  
Disclosure’s	  benefits	  are	  not	  only	  plausible	  and	  varied,	  they	  are	  also	  hard	  to	  
disprove.	  	  Disclosurites	  ordinarily	  attribute	  a	  disclosure	  regime’s	  failure	  to	  achieve	  its	  
goals	  to	  problems	  in	  implementation	  which	  call	  for	  adjustments	  and	  reforms.	  If	  a	  
disclosure	  failed,	  the	  problem	  is	  not	  in	  disclosure	  as	  regulatory	  tool	  but	  in	  some	  
correctible	  flaw	  in	  the	  mandate	  or	  its	  fulfillment.	  	  Thus,	  disclosurites	  who	  are	  otherwise	  
deeply	  committed	  to	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  respond	  to	  disclosure’s	  failure	  with	  proposals	  
to	  improve,	  simplify,	  and	  “properly	  design”	  disclosures.6	  	  TILA,	  for	  example,	  is	  generally	  
thought	  unsuccessful	  because	  it	  has	  not	  led	  consumers	  to	  informed	  credit	  choices.	  	  This	  
despite	  the	  attractions	  of	  TILA’s	  principal	  disclosure	  –	  the	  APR	  –	  which	  is	  the	  prototype	  
“summary	  disclosure”	  of	  disclosurite	  dreams:	  	  “concrete,	  straightforward,	  simple,	  
meaningful,	  timely,	  and	  salient.”7	  	  Its	  “history	  of	  dysfunctional	  reform”	  has	  not	  lessened	  
its	  use—and	  growth—as	  a	  regulatory	  device	  or	  the	  faith	  that	  “disclosures	  are	  useful	  and	  
improvements	  are	  possible.”8	  
	  
Thus,	  perhaps	  because	  disclosure’s	  benefits	  are	  hard	  to	  monetize	  and	  compute	  
concretely,	  its	  benefits	  are	  assumed.	  	  And	  so	  disclosurites	  proffer	  “a	  comprehensive	  
enumeration	  of	  the	  different	  types	  of	  benefits”	  hoping	  that	  this,	  rather	  than	  direct	  
measurement,	  can	  “be	  helpful	  in	  identifying	  the	  full	  range	  of	  program	  effects.”9	  	  	  
	  
B. The	  Failure	  to	  Produce	  Meaningful	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  Thomas	  A.	  Durkin	  &	  Gregory	  Elliehausen,	  Truth	  in	  Lending:	  Theory,	  History,	  and	  a	  Way	  Forward	  
191	  (Oxford	  U	  Press,	  2011).	  
5	  	  Id.,	  at	  173.	  
6	  Cass	  R.	  Sunstein,	  Empirically	  Informed	  Regulation,	  78	  U.	  Chi.	  L.	  Rev.	  1349,	  1366	  (2011).	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  Id	  at	  1369	  (2011).	  
8	  Thomas	  A.	  Durkin	  &	  Gregory	  Elliehausen,	  Truth	  in	  Lending:	  Theory,	  History,	  and	  a	  Way	  Forward	  
xi	  (Oxford	  U	  Press,	  2011).	  
9	  Guidelines	  and	  Discount	  Rates	  for	  Benefit-­‐Cost	  Analysis	  of	  Federal	  Programs,	  Circular	  No.	  A-­‐94	  
Revised,	  p.	  3	  (The	  White	  House	  Office	  of	  Management	  and	  Budget,	  October	  29,	  1992).	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We	  wrote	  a	  book	  explaining	  why	  mandated	  disclosure’s	  benefits	  are	  small,	  and	  
we	  will	  not	  reproduce	  that	  argument	  in	  detail.10	  	  Mandated	  disclosures	  typically	  address	  
unfamiliar	  and	  complex	  issues.	  	  To	  provide	  the	  information	  a	  reasonable	  person	  would	  
want	  to	  make	  a	  good	  decision,	  disclosers	  pile	  so	  much	  information	  on	  readers	  that	  they	  
cannot	  possibly	  cope	  with	  the	  burden	  of	  understanding	  and	  analyzing	  what	  they	  have	  
read.	  These	  problems	  are	  intensified	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  people	  are	  often	  not	  literate	  
enough,	  or	  schooled	  enough	  in	  the	  complexities	  of	  quite	  specialized	  decisions,	  to	  use	  
the	  information	  profitably.	  	  And	  to	  explain	  unfamiliar	  and	  complex	  choices,	  disclosures	  
must	  often	  be	  written	  at	  a	  college	  reading	  level.	  	  	  
	  
In	  addition,	  people	  are	  not	  motivated	  to	  work	  hard	  to	  crack	  disclosures:	  they	  
resist	  contemplating	  a	  transaction’s	  disclosed	  dangers	  of	  the	  transaction;	  they	  have	  
learned	  from	  experience	  and	  from	  informal	  social	  understandings	  to	  regard	  disclosure	  
as	  an	  inane	  legalistic	  ritual	  (how	  often	  have	  you	  read	  any	  bank	  mailing	  disclosing	  new	  
terms	  of	  your	  account?);	  and	  they	  make	  economically	  rational	  decisions	  to	  spend	  their	  
time	  doing	  things	  they	  enjoy	  rather	  than	  struggling	  through	  disclosures	  that	  are	  dense,	  
dull,	  difficult,	  and	  dispiriting.	  	  And	  so	  a	  large	  body	  of	  evidence	  finds	  that	  consumers	  
don’t	  read	  financial	  disclosures	  (or	  for	  that	  matter,	  any	  kind	  of	  disclosure).11	  	  
	  
	   These	  problems	  are	  well	  documented	  and	  well	  known.	  	  Even	  disclosurites	  
implicitly	  acknowledge	  them	  by	  their	  continuing	  search	  for	  new	  disclosure	  forms	  and	  
methods.	  	  Yet	  disclosurites	  persistently	  believe	  they	  can	  be	  overcome.	  	  Disclosurites	  call	  
for	  more	  rigorous	  design,	  harnessing	  behavioral	  insights,	  experimental	  evidence,	  
cutting-­‐edge	  technology,	  and	  (most	  of	  all)	  simplification.	  	  But	  simplification	  and	  a	  
panoply	  of	  other	  solutions	  have	  been	  prescribed	  for	  decades,	  and	  we	  are	  little	  nearer	  
the	  goal	  of	  successful	  disclosure	  than	  when	  we	  started.	  	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  holy	  grail	  
of	  simplification,	  based	  on	  a	  new	  regulatory	  dedication	  to	  social	  science	  and	  empirically-­‐
proven	  methods	  will	  eventually	  be	  discovered.	  We	  cannot	  prove	  otherwise.	  But	  
presenting	  unfamiliar	  and	  complex	  information	  simply	  is	  virtually	  a	  contradiction	  in	  
terms.	  	  
	  
For	  example,	  the	  disclosures	  made	  to	  people	  choosing	  health	  insurance	  plans	  are	  
notoriously	  forbidding	  and	  unhelpful,	  even	  in	  lab-­‐tested	  simplified	  form.	  	  Under	  the	  
Affordable	  Care	  Act,	  reengineered	  “Summary	  of	  Benefits”	  disclosures	  are	  better	  laid	  out	  
than	  before	  but	  still	  are	  so	  stuffed	  with	  information	  that	  “participants	  found	  the	  forms	  
were	  much	  less	  transparent	  than	  they	  initially	  thought,”	  continued	  to	  be	  overwhelmed	  
and	  unable	  to	  manage	  all	  the	  information,	  and	  often	  based	  decisions	  on	  single	  factors	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like	  copays.12	  	  Even	  the	  simplified	  “TILA	  disclosure	  form	  usually	  is	  not	  furnished	  as	  a	  
single	  document.”	  	  Rather,	  a	  “large	  stack	  of	  documents,	  many	  containing	  very	  peripheral	  
information,	  must	  be	  sifted	  through	  in	  order	  to	  find	  the	  one	  or	  two	  pages	  that	  contain	  
key	  information.”13	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	   Another	  kind	  of	  evidence	  of	  the	  limited	  potential	  of	  simplification	  and	  other	  fixes	  
is	  a	  genre	  of	  studies	  using	  simplified	  disclosures	  in	  an	  ideal	  form	  in	  an	  ideal	  setting.	  	  For	  
example,	  the	  SEC	  has	  authorized	  a	  summary	  prospectus	  intended	  to	  speak	  “in	  plain	  
English	  in	  a	  standardized	  order”	  and	  to	  do	  so	  “succinctly,	  in	  three	  or	  four	  pages.”14	  	  
Beshears	  et	  al.	  tested	  the	  prospectus	  on	  a	  group—“Harvard	  non-­‐faculty,	  white-­‐collar	  
staff	  members”—especially	  likely	  to	  understand	  it.	  	  They	  were	  better	  educated	  and	  
more	  sophisticated	  even	  than	  the	  average	  retail	  investor.	  	  Yet	  the	  Summary	  Prospectus	  
did	  “not	  alter	  subjects’	  investment	  choices.	  	  Dollar-­‐weighted	  average	  fees	  and	  past	  
returns	  of	  mutual	  fund	  choices	  [were]	  statistically	  indistinguishable.”	  Even	  when	  
investing	  for	  just	  one	  month,	  they	  chose	  funds	  with	  loads	  and	  fees	  averaging	  200	  basis	  
points	  more	  than	  funds	  with	  the	  lowest	  fees	  (rational	  only	  if,	  miraculously,	  the	  former	  
funds	  did	  24	  percentage	  points	  better	  than	  the	  latter).15	  	  Worse,	  people	  given	  the	  
simplified	  prospectus	  paid	  more	  attention	  to	  past	  returns	  (foolish	  in	  the	  circumstances).	  
	  
Hopes	  for	  better-­‐designed	  financial	  disclosures	  are	  nourished	  by	  apparently	  
successful	  disclosure	  campaigns	  in	  other	  areas.	  For	  example,	  in	  their	  book	  “Full	  
Disclosure”	  (which	  advocates	  a	  version	  of	  mandated	  disclosure	  they	  call	  “targeted	  
transparency”)	  one	  of	  Fung,	  Graham,	  and	  Weil’s	  eight	  examples	  is	  the	  mandatory	  
hygiene-­‐grade	  posted	  in	  restaurants’	  windows.16	  	  It	  has	  become	  the	  poster	  child	  for	  
simplified	  disclosure.	  Can	  disclosure	  succeed	  if	  it	  is	  reduced	  to	  a	  simple	  score	  –	  	  “A”,	  “B”,	  
or	  “C”?	  	  
	  
This	  is	  exactly	  what	  decades	  of	  disclosures	  to	  borrowers	  have	  tried	  to	  do.	  Truth-­‐
in-­‐lending	  laws	  put	  their	  faith	  in	  the	  APR	  –	  the	  score	  intended	  to	  summarize	  a	  loan’s	  
costs.	  	  This	  single	  score	  is	  perhaps	  the	  most	  carefully	  thought	  (and	  regulated)	  disclosure	  
tool,	  and	  some	  studies	  have	  credited	  it	  with	  some	  measure	  of	  success	  in	  improving	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Lynn	  Quincy,	  Making	  Health	  Insurance	  Cost-­‐Sharing	  Clear	  to	  Consumers:	  Challenges	  in	  
Implementing	  Health	  Reform’s	  Insurance	  Disclosure	  Requirements,	  Commonwealth	  Fund	  pub.	  
1480	  Vol.	  2	  (2011).	  
13	  Alan	  M.	  White	  &	  Cathy	  Lesser	  Mansfield,	  Literacy	  and	  Contract,	  13	  Stan.	  L.	  &	  Policy	  Rev.	  233,	  
239	  (2002).	  
14	  	  Enhanced	  Disclosure	  and	  New	  Prospectus	  Delivery	  Option	  for	  Registered	  Open-­‐End	  
Management	  Investment	  Companies,	  Securities	  and	  Exchange	  Commission,	  17	  CFR	  Parts	  230,	  
232,	  239,	  and	  274	  (Release	  Nos.	  33-­‐8861;	  IC-­‐28064;	  File	  No.	  S7-­‐28-­‐070,	  RIN	  3235-­‐AJ44)	  (2007).	  
15	  John	  Beshears	  et	  al.,	  How	  Does	  Simplified	  Disclosure	  Affect	  Individuals’	  Mutual	  Fund	  Choice?,	  
in	  Explorations	  in	  the	  Economics	  of	  Aging,	  ed.	  David	  A.	  Wise	  (U	  Chicago	  Press,	  2011),	  75.	  
16	  Archon	  Fong,	  et	  al,	  Full	  Disclosure:	  The	  Perils	  and	  Promise	  of	  Transparency	  (Cambridge,	  2008).	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loan	  terms	  consumers	  receive.17	  Yet	  it	  is	  widely	  thought	  a	  failure	  in	  the	  sub-­‐prime	  credit	  
markets	  (where	  it	  is	  needed	  most),18	  and	  even	  the	  favorable	  assessments	  of	  this	  regime	  
have	  not	  shown	  that	  it	  exceeds	  its	  compliance	  cost.19	  	  
	  
In	  fact,	  even	  simplification’s	  emblem—the	  restaurant	  hygiene	  grading—rests	  on	  
empirical	  evidence	  that	  is,	  at	  best,	  equivocal.	  	  Despite	  one	  oft-­‐cited	  study	  showing	  a	  
sensational	  20%	  decline	  in	  food-­‐borne	  illnesses	  after	  the	  mandate	  was	  imposed,20	  
newer	  and	  better	  data	  find	  no	  evidence	  of	  health	  benefits.	  	  Grades	  (however	  plausible)	  
“do	  not	  convey	  meaningful	  information	  that	  would	  enable	  consumers	  to	  choose	  
between	  riskier	  and	  less	  risky	  establishments.”	  Worse	  is	  “startling	  evidence	  that	  grading	  
displaced	  agency	  resources	  away	  from	  compliance	  inspections	  (generally	  at	  worse-­‐
scoring	  restaurants)	  to	  reinspections	  (generally	  at	  better-­‐scoring	  restaurants.)”21	  	  This	  is	  
a	  typical	  artifact	  of	  disclosure	  law,	  channeling	  compliance	  effort	  to	  the	  disclosed	  
features	  and	  away	  from	  the	  non-­‐disclosed	  ones.	  
	  
	   In	  some	  areas,	  disclosurites	  recognize	  that	  disclosures	  neither	  reach	  disclosees	  
nor	  improve	  their	  decision	  but	  hope	  that	  sophisticated	  intermediaries	  can	  be	  “reading	  
agents”	  disseminating	  information	  to	  the	  great	  mass	  of	  nonreaders.	  	  The	  classic	  example	  
is	  investment	  bankers	  who	  base	  advice	  on	  their	  reading	  of	  firms’	  financial	  disclosures.	  	  
Whether	  mandated	  disclosure	  is	  necessary	  for	  such	  intermediaries	  is	  disputed	  even	  in	  
securities	  markets,	  where	  the	  intermediaries	  clearly	  exist.	  In	  other	  areas	  of	  financial	  
disclosure,	  it	  is	  a	  mirage.	  Does	  any	  sophisticated	  agent	  base	  recommendations	  to	  
borrow	  on	  consumer-­‐credit	  disclosures?	  	  What	  effective	  intermediary	  helps	  banks’	  
customers	  master	  the	  fees,	  overdraft	  rules,	  and	  terms	  of	  service	  for	  standard	  checking	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  See,	  e.g.,	  Victor	  Stango	  and	  Jonathan	  Zinman,	  Fuzzy	  Math,	  Disclosure	  Regulation	  and	  Credit	  
Market	  Outcomes,	  24	  Rev.	  Econ.	  Stud	  507	  (2011);	  Patricia	  A.	  McCoy,	  Rethinking	  Disclosure	  in	  a	  
World	  of	  Risk-­‐Based	  Pricing,	  44	  	  Harv.	  J.	  on	  Legis.	  123	  (2007);	  Jinkook	  Lee	  and	  Jeanne	  M.	  Hogarth,	  
Consumer	  Information	  Search	  for	  Home	  Mortgages:	  Who,	  What,	  How	  Much,	  and	  What	  Else?	  9	  
Fin.	  Services	  Rev.	  277	  (2000);	  Elizabeth	  Renuart	  and	  Diane	  E.	  Thompson,	  The	  Truth,	  the	  Whole	  
Truth,	  and	  Nothing	  but	  the	  Truth:	  Fulfilling	  the	  Promise	  of	  Truth	  in	  Lending,	  25	  Yale	  J.	  Reg.	  181,	  
189	  (2008).	  
18	  See,	  e.g.,	  Edward	  L.	  Rubin,	  Legislative	  Methodology:	  Some	  Lessons	  from	  the	  Truth-­‐in-­‐Lending	  
Act,	  80	  Geo.	  L.J.	  233	  (1991);	  Jeff	  Sovern,	  Preventing	  Future	  Economic	  Crises	  Through	  Consumer	  
Protection	  Law	  or	  How	  the	  Truth	  in	  Lending	  Act	  Failed	  the	  Subprime	  Borrowers,	  71	  Ohio	  St.	  L.	  J.	  
761	  (2010);	  James	  M.	  Lacko	  and	  Janis	  K.	  Pappalardo,	  Improving	  Consumer	  Mortgage	  Disclosures:	  
An	  Empirical	  Assessment	  of	  Current	  and	  Prototype	  Disclosure	  Forms	  (Federal	  Trade	  Commission,	  
Bureau	  of	  Economics	  Staff	  Report	  2007).	  
19	  Stango	  and	  Zinman,	  supra	  note	  17,	  at	  509	  (“Our	  results	  also	  highlight	  the	  practical	  downside	  
of	  disclosure	  regulation:	  Any	  benefits	  of	  mandated	  APR	  disclosure	  may	  be	  offset	  by	  compliance	  
and	  enforcement	  costs.”)	  
20	  Ginger	  Zhe	  Jin	  &	  Philip	  Leslie,	  The	  Effect	  of	  Information	  on	  Product	  Quality:	  Evidence	  from	  
Restaurant	  Hygiene	  Grade	  Cards,	  118	  Quar.	  J.	  Econ.	  409	  (2003).	  
21	  Daniel	  E.	  Ho,	  Fudging	  the	  Nudge:	  Information	  Disclosure	  and	  Restaurant	  Grading	  ,	  122	  Yale	  L	  J	  
574	  (2012).	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accounts?	  Or	  assists	  people	  with	  credit-­‐card	  contracts,	  prepaid	  debit-­‐card	  fees,	  or	  
payday	  lending?	  Besides,	  if	  sophisticated	  intermediaries	  are	  the	  true	  targets	  of	  
disclosures,	  why	  has	  simplification	  become	  the	  priority	  of	  disclosure	  regulation?	  
	  
	   In	  sum,	  no	  systematic	  empirical	  evidence	  finds	  that	  mandated	  disclosure	  
achieves	  its	  goals,	  but	  disclosurites	  continue	  to	  assume	  it	  works	  or	  think	  it	  can	  be	  fixed.	  	  
We	  mentioned	  the	  regulators	  who	  identified	  thirty-­‐eight	  goals	  of	  truth-­‐in-­‐lending	  
disclosures.	  They	  examine	  each	  set	  of	  goals	  and	  find	  a	  “regrettable	  paucity	  of	  evidence.”	  	  
Yet	  without	  empirical	  basis	  they	  conclude:	  “it	  seems	  clear	  that	  required	  disclosures	  
likely	  have	  had	  a	  favorable	  impact.”22	  This	  is	  the	  triumph	  of	  hope	  over	  experience.	  
	  
If	  regulators	  were	  committed	  to	  justification	  by	  works	  –	  by	  genuine	  cost-­‐benefit	  
analysis	  of	  disclosure	  regulation	  –	  rather	  than	  to	  justification	  by	  faith,	  how	  would	  they	  
proceed?	  	  A	  standard	  solution	  is	  laboratory	  testing	  to	  show	  that	  disclosees	  understand	  
new	  formats	  better	  than	  old	  ones	  (although	  improved	  understanding	  does	  not	  assure	  
improved	  decisions).	  Some	  of	  these	  experiments	  seem	  moderately	  encouraging:	  	  
Isolated	  from	  other	  concerns,	  focused	  on	  their	  task,	  and	  led	  by	  researchers	  anxious	  for	  
success,	  some	  people	  do	  somewhat	  better	  some	  of	  the	  time.	  Such	  improvements	  have	  
been	  achieved,	  for	  example,	  by	  the	  Consumer	  Financial	  Protection	  Bureau’s	  financial	  
disclosure	  forms	  (under	  a	  highly	  motivated	  regulatory	  agenda	  of	  “Know	  Before	  You	  
Owe”),	  by	  health	  regulators	  developing	  new	  health-­‐benefits	  summaries,	  and	  by	  scholars	  
studying	  payday	  lending.	  This	  method,	  when	  informed	  by	  sophisticated	  behavioral	  
insights	  and	  empirical	  studies,	  rekindles	  hopes	  for	  rigorous	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis.	  But	  it	  




A. The	  Allure	  of	  Mandated	  Disclosure:	  Low	  Cost	  
	  
	   Mandated	  disclosure	  is	  ubiquitous	  not	  only	  because	  its	  benefits	  seem	  so	  plain,	  
but	  also	  because	  its	  costs	  look	  so	  low.	  	  Sophisticated	  disclosurites	  recognize	  that	  
disclosure’s	  benefits	  may	  be	  modest	  but	  imagine	  that	  its	  costs	  are	  so	  trivial	  that	  it	  is	  “at	  
worst,	  harmless.”23	  	  Disclosure’s	  costs	  do	  look	  obvious	  and	  modest.	  	  Disclosures	  seem	  to	  
consist	  largely	  of	  technical	  information	  that	  is	  easily	  revealed	  without	  the	  kinds	  of	  costs	  
that	  require	  contentious	  (often	  tragic)	  trade-­‐offs.	  	  
	  
	   The	  modest	  costs	  come	  in	  several	  forms.	  	  First,	  the	  cost	  to	  regulate.	  	  Lawmakers	  
must	  craft	  well-­‐gauged	  mandates,	  but	  unlike	  laws	  directly	  regulating	  prices	  and	  
standards,	  this	  requires	  minimal	  effort	  and	  cost.	  While	  a	  small	  regiment	  of	  government	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Thomas	  A.	  Durkin	  &	  Gregory	  Elliehausen,	  Truth	  in	  Lending:	  Theory,	  History,	  and	  a	  Way	  
Forward	  211	  (Oxford	  U	  Press,	  2011).	  
23	  Robert	  A.	  Hillman	  &	  Maureen	  O’Rourke,	  Defending	  Disclosure	  in	  Software	  Contracting,	  78	  
Univ.	  of	  Chicago	  L.	  Rev.	  95,	  107-­‐08	  (2011).	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officials	  oversee,	  tweak,	  and	  clarify	  mandates	  like	  truth-­‐in-­‐lending	  laws,	  the	  rest	  is	  done	  
by	  private	  parties.	  Mandated	  disclosure	  needs	  no	  subsidies,	  little	  research,	  and	  minor	  
enforcement.	  	  It	  does	  not	  require	  subsidies	  (this	  would	  be	  really	  costly).	  It	  does	  not	  
seem	  to	  impose	  much	  delay.	  	  Disclosure	  regulation,	  then,	  looks	  not	  only	  cheap,	  but	  
wonderfully	  cheaper	  than	  its	  alternatives.	  	  
	  
The	  second	  and	  usually	  largest	  item	  in	  the	  cost	  column	  of	  cost	  benefit	  analysis	  is	  
regulation’s	  effect	  on	  regulated	  entities.	  In	  other	  areas,	  like	  environmental	  or	  safety	  
regulation,	  compliance	  costs	  can	  be	  high	  and	  regulated	  parties	  must	  often	  alter	  the	  kind	  
and	  quantity	  of	  their	  activities.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  FDA’s	  cost	  benefit	  analysis	  of	  the	  
efficacy	  of	  drugs	  costs	  billions	  and	  takes	  years,	  which	  means	  costly	  delays	  in	  introducing	  
valuable	  treatments,	  but	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  generate	  substantial	  benefits	  as	  well.	  	  
	  
Complying	  with	  disclosure	  mandates	  is	  hardly	  costless,	  but	  it	  implicates	  none	  of	  
the	  really	  expensive	  elements	  of	  ordinary	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  because	  it	  rarely	  requires	  
changes	  in	  the	  discloser’s	  primary	  activities	  (although	  such	  changes	  might	  result	  if	  
disclosures	  were	  effective	  in	  shaping	  consumer	  demand).	  Unlike	  FDA	  drug	  approval	  
regulation,	  for	  example,	  disclosure	  regulation	  lets	  firms	  sell	  any	  product	  if	  they	  disclose	  
its	  risks.	  	  In	  general,	  firms	  distribute	  information	  they	  presumably	  have.	  	  Compliance	  is	  
thus	  achieved	  by	  making	  texts	  available,	  either	  by	  printing	  and	  distributing	  them,	  or	  by	  
posting	  them	  digitally.	  	  They	  need	  only	  design	  disclosures	  about	  their	  conditions,	  
contingencies,	  and	  conflicts,	  and	  attach	  new	  forms	  to	  the	  otherwise	  unchanged	  
transactions.	  Compliance,	  in	  other	  words,	  is	  accomplished	  by	  hiring	  lawyers	  who	  
interpret	  the	  mandate	  and	  design	  the	  language	  of	  the	  disclosure;	  it	  is	  not	  necessary	  to	  
redesign	  a	  product,	  relocate	  a	  factory,	  or	  build	  higher	  smoke	  stacks.	  
	  
Disclosure	  regulation	  may	  impose	  another	  category	  of	  costs	  on	  disclosers:	  
liability	  costs.	  Firms	  subject	  to	  mandates	  may	  be	  sued	  and	  found	  to	  have	  under-­‐
disclosed.	  In	  financial	  areas,	  these	  costs	  can	  matter.	  	  But	  such	  charges	  do	  not	  affect	  cost	  
benefit	  analysis	  because	  they	  are	  private,	  not	  social,	  costs.	  Every	  dollar	  a	  discloser	  who	  
violates	  a	  mandate	  pays	  is	  a	  dollar	  recovered	  by	  a	  plaintiff	  harmed	  by	  the	  violation.	  	  	  
	  
True,	  liability	  may	  involve	  deadweight	  loss,	  like	  lawyers’	  fees,	  court	  time,	  and	  
even	  defensive	  conduct	  (e.g,	  leaving	  a	  market	  where	  suits	  are	  frequent).	  But	  such	  costs	  
are	  hard	  to	  factor	  into	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis.	  	  Regulation	  can	  and	  should	  consider	  the	  
cost	  of	  compliance,	  not	  the	  cost	  of	  non-­‐compliance.	  	  
	  
Finally,	  the	  costs	  of	  disclosure	  look	  modest	  because	  errors	  in	  measuring	  them	  
look	  harmless.	  No	  jobs	  are	  lost,	  no	  factories	  close,	  no	  one	  sickens	  and	  dies.	  Politician	  will	  
not	  complain	  about	  disclosure’s	  harms,	  and	  disclosers	  often	  prefer	  these	  mandates	  to	  
regulation	  with	  bite.	  	  	  
	  
B. The	  Uncounted	  Costs	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One	  kind	  of	  cost	  of	  mandated	  disclosure	  has	  particularly	  escaped	  the	  notice	  of	  
law-­‐makers	  and	  commentators.	  	  It	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  cost	  that	  would	  be	  hard,	  probably	  
impossible,	  to	  handle	  in	  any	  ordinary	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  because	  it	  is	  virtually	  
impossible	  to	  measure	  directly.	  	  But	  were	  it	  measurable,	  we	  believe	  this	  cost	  by	  itself	  
would	  be	  great	  enough	  to	  make	  most	  disclosure	  regulation	  unjustifiable.	  
	  
This	  cost	  is	  the	  value	  that	  disclosures	  exact	  from	  each	  other.	  	  Disclosures	  
compete	  for	  their	  audience’s	  attention.	  But	  the	  audience	  is	  so	  deluged	  by	  mandated	  
disclosures	  that	  attention	  given	  to	  one	  necessarily	  comes	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  others.	  Thus,	  
to	  achieve	  meaningful	  benefit	  in	  terms	  of	  affecting	  people’s	  decisions,	  the	  cost	  involved	  
would	  be	  measured	  by	  the	  reduced	  attention	  to,	  and	  effectiveness	  of,	  other	  disclosures.	  	  	  
Given	  the	  structure	  and	  dynamics	  of	  American	  government	  and	  regulation,	  this	  poses	  
devastating	  problems	  for	  lawmakers,	  problems	  that	  pervade	  and	  cripple	  mandated	  
disclosures.	  	  	  
	  
Imagine	  a	  disclosure	  given	  to	  a	  mortgagor	  –	  Disclosure	  #1	  (“D1”).	  	  It	  tells	  the	  
borrower	  the	  monthly	  payments.	  	  Because	  the	  mortgage	  terms	  permit	  the	  lender	  to	  
adjust	  interest	  rates,	  the	  disclosure	  gives	  the	  borrower	  an	  estimated	  range	  of	  payments.	  
For	  many	  borrowers,	  this	  is	  the	  most	  important	  datum	  in	  evaluating	  the	  loan.	  Suppose	  
D1	  is	  the	  mortgagor’s	  only	  mandated	  disclosure.	  It	  is	  presented	  in	  a	  well-­‐designed	  and	  
tested	  format	  and	  –	  for	  good	  measure	  –	  explained	  orally.	  The	  discloser	  tests	  the	  
borrower’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  loan	  and	  of	  the	  availability	  of	  loans	  with	  fixed	  rates.	  	  If	  
dissemination	  costs	  are	  low,	  D1	  bids	  fair	  to	  pass	  cost	  benefit	  analysis.	  
	  
Consider	  now	  a	  second	  disclosure,	  D2.	  It	  tells	  the	  borrower	  that	  the	  loan’s	  cost	  
also	  includes	  the	  home	  insurance	  the	  creditor	  requires.	  Like	  D1,	  D2	  has	  low	  marginal	  
delivery	  costs.	  	  Like	  D1,	  D2	  helps	  borrowers	  by	  discouraging	  undue	  optimism	  about	  
whether	  they	  can	  afford	  the	  loan	  and	  by	  encouraging	  them	  to	  shop	  for	  cheaper	  
insurance.	  	  Thus,	  like	  D1,	  D2	  seems	  to	  pass	  cost	  benefit	  analysis.	  
	  
But	  there	  is	  an	  uncounted	  cost	  to	  D2.	  	  It	  is	  disclosed	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  D1—at	  
the	  loan	  application	  (or	  closing).	  	  	  The	  borrower’s	  limited	  attention	  must	  now	  be	  divided	  
across	  two	  disclosures.	  	  Some	  borrowers	  may	  spend	  extra	  time	  and	  attention	  on	  the	  
combined	  D1	  +	  D2,	  but	  at	  least	  some	  of	  the	  attention	  to	  D1	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  crowded	  out.	  
Thus	  D2	  reduces	  D1’s	  effectiveness.	  	  	  
	  
Now	  add	  D3,	  D4,	  D5,	  D6,	  .	  .	  .	  	  ,	  Dn.	  Each	  D—delivered	  alone—could	  be	  made	  
effective	  and	  useful	  to	  many	  borrowers.	  Each,	  viewed	  alone,	  might	  pass	  cost	  
effectiveness	  analysis.	  	  Each,	  empirically	  tested	  in	  artificial	  surroundings,	  helps	  more	  
than	  a	  few	  trial	  participants.	  	  But	  as	  each	  joins	  the	  accumulation	  of	  disclosures,	  any	  
attention	  it	  draws	  reduces	  the	  attention	  the	  others	  get.	  	  	  
	  
This	  example	  is	  not	  imaginary.	  It	  captures	  the	  exact	  reality	  of	  consumer	  credit	  
disclosure	  regulation.	  	  The	  Consumer	  Financial	  Protection	  Bureau	  recently	  tried	  to	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simplify	  federal	  mortgage	  disclosures.	  Before	  the	  reform,	  federal	  law	  mandated	  two	  
separate	  disclosures	  of	  the	  loan’s	  terms:	  the	  Truth-­‐in-­‐Lending	  Act	  statement	  (the	  APR	  
and	  several	  other	  factors)	  and	  the	  Real	  Estate	  Settlement	  Procedures	  Act	  disclosures	  
(the	  Good	  Faith	  Estimate	  and	  the	  HUD-­‐1	  settlement	  statement).	  The	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  Act	  
required	  the	  Bureau	  to	  unify	  the	  two	  overlapping	  and	  confusing	  disclosures	  into	  a	  single	  
integrated	  disclosure.24	  	  The	  Bureau	  used	  sophisticated	  empirical	  methods	  in	  a	  rigorous	  
effort	  to	  produce	  one	  simple	  and	  effective	  disclosure.	  	  
	  
The	  Bureau	  followed	  an	  impressive	  protocol	  for	  regulatory	  design.	  A	  professional	  
research	  company	  tested	  multiple	  versions	  of	  the	  disclosure	  over	  time	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  
social-­‐demographic	  settings.	  	  It	  deployed	  sophisticated	  quantitative	  research	  methods.	  	  
It	  harnessed	  the	  literature	  on	  cognitive	  processes	  and	  behavioral	  biases.	  The	  designers	  
conducted	  experiments	  in	  which	  subjects	  were	  given	  forms	  and	  tested	  in	  one-­‐on-­‐one	  
interviews.	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  imagine	  what	  else	  the	  Bureau	  could	  have	  done	  to	  obey	  the	  
statutory	  command	  to	  simplify	  and	  clarify	  the	  disclosure.	  This	  effort	  produced	  a	  new	  
and	  distinctively	  clear	  disclosure	  format:	  a	  three-­‐page	  form	  that	  replaces	  the	  seven-­‐
page	  dual	  disclosures.	  The	  research	  team	  wrote	  a	  500-­‐page	  report	  explaining	  how	  it	  
developed	  the	  new	  design	  and	  measuring	  the	  improvement	  in	  understanding	  it	  
produced.25	  This	  comes	  as	  close	  as	  possible	  to	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  of	  a	  disclosure	  
mandate.26	  
	  
Is	  this	  a	  regulatory	  success?	  	  	  Hopes	  for	  it	  are	  inspired	  by	  the	  way	  the	  forms	  were	  
drafted	  and	  tested.	  	  	  But	  the	  forms	  are	  tested	  in	  an	  environment	  so	  different	  from	  the	  
real	  world	  that	  their	  success	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  illusory:	  they	  show	  that	  if	  people	  are	  
sufficiently	  focused	  on	  the	  cognitive	  task	  of	  learning	  about	  a	  specific	  issue,	  their	  
understanding	  increases	  by	  good	  presentation	  of	  materials.	  	  In	  the	  real	  world	  of	  
mortgage	  disclosure,	  however,	  borrowers	  cannot	  focus	  their	  attention	  with	  the	  intensity	  
achieved	  in	  laboratory	  experiments	  because	  they	  receive	  more	  than	  the	  single	  simplified	  
form.	  	  Even	  a	  relatively	  simple	  mortgage	  transaction	  may	  be	  accompanied	  by	  as	  many	  as	  
fifty(!)	  separate	  disclosures	  mandated	  by	  various	  agencies	  and	  statutes.	  	  The	  Bureau’s	  
new	  form	  is	  only	  one	  of	  these.	  There	  are	  disclosures	  mandated	  by	  other	  federal	  
agencies,	  by	  state	  legislatures,	  by	  municipal	  laws,	  and	  by	  state	  and	  federal	  court	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  12	  U.S.C.	  5532(f),	  12	  U.S.C.	  2603(a),	  15	  U.S.C.	  1604(b).	  
25	  Know	  Before	  You	  Owe:	  Evolution	  of	  the	  TILA-­‐RESPA	  Disclosures	  (Report	  Presented	  to	  the	  Consumer	  
Financial	  Protection	  Bureau,	  July	  9,	  2012),	  available	  at	  
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201207_cfpb_report_tila-­‐respa-­‐testing.pdf.	  The	  Bureau	  adopted	  the	  
new	  integrated	  disclosure	  format	  in	  a	  regulation	  published	  at	  the	  end	  of	  2013,	  effective	  August	  1,	  2015.	  
See	  Bureau	  of	  Consumer	  Financial	  Protection,	  Integrated	  Mortgage	  Disclosures	  under	  the	  Real	  Estate	  
Settlement	  Procedures	  Act	  (Regulation	  X)	  and	  the	  Truth	  In	  Lending	  Act	  (Regulation	  Z),	  12	  CFR	  Parts	  1024	  
and	  1026.	  The	  new	  forms	  may	  be	  viewed	  at	  www.consumerfinance.gov/knowbeforeyouowe/compare/.	  
26	  A	  similar	  effort	  was	  conducted	  by	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  in	  2008.	  See	  Design	  and	  Testing	  of	  Effective	  Truth	  
in	  Lending	  Disclosures:	  Findings	  from	  Experimental	  Study	  (Report	  Submitted	  to	  the	  Board	  of	  Governers	  of	  
the	  Federal	  Reserve,	  December	  15,	  2008),	  available	  at	  
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20081218a8.pdf.	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decisions.	  There	  are	  disclosures	  about	  the	  loan’s	  tax	  consequences;	  the	  property	  
appraisal;	  the	  lender’s	  credit	  reporting	  practices;	  agents’	  conflicts	  of	  interests;	  the	  right	  
to	  cancel	  the	  transaction;	  compliance	  with	  non-­‐discrimination	  statutes;	  privacy	  and	  data	  
collection;	  payment	  options;	  escrow	  choices;	  and	  much	  more.	  There	  is	  even	  –	  
wonderfully	  –	  the	  Paperwork	  Reduction	  Act	  disclosure.	  
	  
So	  instead	  of	  receiving	  a	  single	  form	  in	  the	  artificial	  circumstances	  of	  a	  pre-­‐
regulatory	  laboratory	  study,	  actual	  borrowers	  get	  a	  disclosure	  stack	  easily	  exceeding	  
one	  hundred	  pages	  and	  needing	  dozens	  of	  signatures.	  	  Even	  if	  each	  of	  these	  fifty	  
disclosures	  were	  superbly	  designed,	  their	  accumulation	  would	  defeat	  their	  purpose.	  	  	  
	  
A	  disclosure,	  put	  differently,	  grazes	  a	  public	  commons	  –	  people’s	  attention.	  Each	  
draws	  a	  bit	  more	  of	  this	  resource,	  degrading	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  other	  disclosures.	  As	  
disclosures	  are	  regulated	  piecemeal,	  this	  negative	  externality	  is	  not	  counted	  and	  cannot	  
possibly	  be	  measured.	  The	  negative	  externality—the	  reduced	  effectiveness	  of	  other	  
disclosures,	  depends	  on	  n—the	  number	  of	  disclosures	  people	  get.	  When	  it	  is	  high,	  any	  
incremental	  attention	  to	  each	  disclosure	  is	  offset	  by	  the	  reduced	  attention	  to	  other	  
disclosures.	  
	  
Might	  this	  problem	  be	  solved	  by	  using	  a	  single	  meta-­‐regulator	  for	  all	  financial	  
disclosures?	  	  This	  regulator	  would	  select	  the	  optimal	  number	  of	  disclosures.	  It	  would	  
prioritize	  the	  few	  that	  really	  matter	  and	  stop	  when	  the	  crowding-­‐out	  effect	  offset	  a	  new	  
disclosure’s	  benefit.	  	  Alas,	  this	  is	  impractical.	  
	  
First,	  consumer	  credit	  is	  regulated	  by	  federal,	  state,	  and	  local	  jurisdictions,	  and	  
within	  each	  jurisdiction	  by	  institutions	  including	  legislatures,	  administrative	  agencies,	  
and	  courts.	  	  For	  example,	  consumer	  mortgages	  raise	  issues	  within	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  
separate	  specialist	  agencies	  that	  regulate	  money	  and	  finances,	  privacy,	  real	  estate,	  tax,	  
safety,	  and	  insurance.	  	  Even	  if,	  marvelously,	  each	  agency	  could	  mandate	  only	  one	  
disclosure	  –	  a	  “D1”	  of	  its	  domain	  –	  the	  disclosures	  would	  converge	  at	  the	  closing,	  
jostling	  for	  attention.	  	  Each	  agency’s	  disclosure	  would	  diminish	  –	  in	  ways	  and	  to	  an	  
extent	  that	  would	  be	  hard	  to	  ascertain	  –	  the	  other	  agencies’	  efforts.	  
	  
Second,	  the	  accumulation	  problem	  is	  due	  to	  another	  institutional	  overlap:	  the	  
gradual	  aggregation	  of	  disclosures	  over	  time.	  	  Lawmakers	  issue	  mandates	  in	  response	  to	  
social	  problems	  as	  they	  arise.	  If	  a	  drug	  causes	  harm	  in	  a	  new	  way,	  a	  new	  warning	  seems	  
necessary—the	  n-­‐th	  item	  in	  a	  sequence	  of	  warnings.	  When	  the	  agency	  issues	  it,	  or	  when	  
the	  court	  adds	  it	  to	  the	  list	  of	  mandated	  warnings,	  there	  is	  neither	  opportunity,	  
information,	  method,	  nor	  incentive	  to	  evaluate	  its	  degrading	  effect	  on	  existing	  
mandates.	  This	  problem	  is	  particularly	  acute	  for	  the	  common	  law	  method	  of	  mandating	  
disclosure	  (say,	  under	  contract	  law’s	  fraud	  doctrine	  or	  tort	  law’s	  duty	  to	  warn	  doctrine).	  
Judges	  see	  the	  risk	  that	  materialized	  but	  don’t	  see	  how	  cluttered	  the	  disclosure	  
landscape	  already	  was.	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This	  problem	  besets	  even	  sophisticated	  lawmakers.	  The	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  Act	  was	  
launched	  to	  the	  beat	  of	  a	  different	  drum—of	  smart	  and	  simplified	  disclosure—but	  it	  too	  
added	  to	  the	  notorious	  litter	  of	  mortgage	  disclosures.	  	  Tellingly,	  the	  Act	  instructed	  
regulators	  to	  laboriously	  shorten	  two	  disclosure	  forms	  to	  their	  bare	  essentials,	  but	  it	  
also	  added	  a	  host	  of	  new	  disclosures.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  remaining	  old	  disclosures,	  the	  
new	  mandated	  form	  now	  discloses	  mysterious	  items	  like	  “total	  interest	  percentage,”	  
“liability	  after	  foreclosure,”	  “partial	  payment	  policy,”	  and	  “negative	  amortization.”	  And	  
the	  Bureau	  is	  required	  to	  issue	  rules	  implementing	  new	  disclosures	  on	  matters	  such	  as	  
“reset	  of	  hybrid	  adjustable	  rate	  mortgage,”	  “loan	  originator	  identifier,”	  “appraisals	  for	  
high	  risk	  mortgages,”	  and	  “post	  consummation	  escrow	  cancellation.”27	  
	  
So	  what	  is	  an	  agency,	  wholeheartedly	  committed	  to	  systematic	  cost	  benefit	  
analysis,	  to	  do?	  	  It	  lacks	  the	  authority	  to	  abolish	  old	  disclosures	  mandated	  by	  lawmakers	  
or	  by	  other	  agencies.	  	  It	  has	  few	  incentives	  to	  decide	  that	  its	  own	  old	  mandates	  have	  
gone	  stale	  or	  to	  clear	  the	  stage	  for	  new	  ones.	  There	  never	  seems	  to	  be	  evidential	  basis	  
to	  eliminate	  an	  old	  disclosure,	  but	  there	  is	  constantly	  evidence	  for	  new	  ones.	  
	  
The	  accumulation	  problem,	  we	  see,	  arises	  from	  inter-­‐disclosure	  dilemma,	  both	  
across	  agencies	  and	  across	  time.	  But	  it	  is	  further,	  hopelessly,	  exacerbated	  by	  the	  fact	  
that	  disclosures	  are	  mandated	  in	  so	  many	  areas	  in	  which	  people	  must	  make	  unfamiliar,	  
complex,	  and	  consequential	  choices.	  	  The	  borrower	  who	  confronts	  the	  stack	  of	  fifty	  
disclosures	  about	  a	  mortgage	  lives	  in	  a	  steady	  drizzle	  of	  disclosures	  about	  innumerable	  
other	  decisions,	  financial	  and	  others.	  	  	  The	  borrower	  has	  a	  checking	  account,	  a	  few	  
credit	  cards,	  and	  perhaps	  an	  investment	  account,	  all	  dripping	  with	  disclosures.	  	  	  The	  
borrower	  buys	  products	  festooned	  in	  often	  lengthy	  disclosures	  about	  what	  the	  product	  
is,	  how	  to	  use	  it,	  and	  which	  risks	  it	  poses.	  	  The	  borrower	  uses	  the	  internet	  and	  enters	  
sites	  that	  are	  a	  patchwork	  of	  disclosures	  about	  privacy	  policies,	  terms	  of	  service,	  fees,	  
and	  much	  more.	  	  The	  borrower	  is	  a	  patient	  who	  is	  offered	  a	  choice	  of	  treatments	  whose	  
nature,	  benefits,	  risks,	  and	  alternatives	  must	  be	  detailed.	  	  The	  borrower	  must	  choose	  
from	  a	  menu	  of	  health-­‐care	  plans	  and	  select	  ad-­‐hoc	  medical	  treatment,	  all	  with	  
sophisticated	  financial	  implications—all	  explained	  in	  disclosures.	  	  The	  borrower	  is	  a	  
citizen	  who	  is	  subject	  to	  a	  barrage	  of	  disclosure	  campaigns	  intended	  to	  make	  the	  
borrower	  healthy,	  wealthy,	  safe,	  and	  sage.	  	  The	  borrower,	  in	  short,	  is	  asked	  to	  study	  
disclosures	  many	  times	  each	  day.	  (Just	  reading	  all	  privacy	  disclosure	  the	  borrower	  got	  
annually	  would	  take	  six	  weeks.)	  No	  lawmaker,	  however	  shrewd,	  sophisticated,	  and	  
skilled	  can	  make	  disclosures	  work	  well	  in	  this	  environment.	  	  	  
	  
Furthermore,	  nothing	  draws	  the	  lawmaker’s	  attention	  to	  the	  accumulation	  
problem,	  nor	  would	  raising	  it	  be	  politically	  attractive	  or	  (often)	  legally	  relevant.	  Would	  a	  
court	  adjudicating	  a	  tort	  failure	  to	  warn	  suit	  ever	  stop	  short	  of	  requiring	  a	  warning	  just	  
because	  too	  many	  disclosure	  already	  deplete	  people’s	  attention?	  	  Even	  if	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Integrated	  Mortgage	  Disclosures	  under	  the	  Real	  Estate	  Settlement	  Procedures	  Act	  (Regulation	  X)	  and	  
the	  Truth	  In	  Lending	  Act	  (Regulation	  Z),	  12	  CFR	  Parts	  1024	  and	  1026,	  pp.	  82-­‐83.	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accumulation	  problem	  were	  recognized	  in	  the	  literature,	  even	  if	  lawmakers	  assimilated	  
the	  literature,	  and	  even	  if	  lawmakers	  wanted	  to	  prune	  the	  disclosure	  thicket,	  they	  would	  
have	  neither	  the	  incentives	  nor	  occasion	  to	  do	  it	  effectively.	  	  	  
	  
No	  method	  of	  trying	  to	  measure	  disclosure’s	  cost-­‐effectiveness	  can	  account	  for	  
the	  accumulation	  problem.	  The	  externality	  that	  each	  disclosure	  imposes	  on	  others	  
cannot	  be	  measured.	  	  Although	  it	  is	  obvious,	  the	  accumulation	  problem	  is	  not	  even	  
recognized.	  Regulators	  are	  well	  aware	  of	  a	  different	  quantity	  problem	  –	  the	  problem	  of	  
overload.	  But	  while	  they	  recognize	  that	  too	  much	  information	  within	  a	  disclosure	  is	  
pointless,	  they	  do	  not	  recognize	  that	  too	  much	  information	  across	  disclosures	  is	  also	  
harmful.	  The	  problem	  of	  extensive	  disclosures	  has	  not	  been	  identified	  as	  its	  closely	  
related	  problem	  of	  intensive	  disclosures.	  And	  while	  intensive,	  overloaded,	  disclosures	  




How	  can	  lawmakers	  mandate	  disclosures	  so	  promiscuously	  with	  so	  little	  
evidence	  that	  they	  do	  more	  good	  than	  harm?	  	  Partly	  because	  disclosures	  are	  often	  
mandated	  not	  so	  much	  because	  they	  are	  expected	  to	  work	  as	  because	  they	  are	  the	  only	  
practical	  response	  to	  pressure	  to	  act.	  	  	  That	  is	  a	  poor	  reason	  to	  mandate	  disclosures,	  but	  
it	  beguilingly	  easy	  to	  believe	  that	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  is	  unneeded.	  	  Mandated	  
disclosure	  seems	  so	  plausible,	  and	  its	  failure	  is	  so	  easily	  explained.	  	  Thus,	  even	  when	  
lawmakers	  and	  commentators	  think	  somewhat	  more	  explicitly	  than	  usual	  about	  
disclosure’s	  costs	  and	  benefits,	  the	  balance	  seems	  at	  first	  glance	  self-­‐evidently	  to	  be	  on	  
the	  benefit	  side.	  	  	  
	  
But	  the	  benefits	  of	  mandated	  disclosure	  have	  been	  notoriously	  elusive,	  and	  
nowhere	  more	  prominently	  than	  in	  consumer	  financial	  regulation.	  In	  fact,	  it	  would	  
astonishing	  if	  disclosures	  yielded	  much	  benefit.	  	  Financial	  products	  are	  complex,	  
generally	  for	  good	  reasons.	  	  Millions	  and	  millions	  of	  people	  are	  only	  modestly	  literate,	  
and	  millions	  and	  millions	  more	  are	  financially	  illiterate.	  	  How	  can	  they	  learn	  to	  make	  
good	  choices	  through	  tutorials	  plastered	  on	  fine	  print	  forms?	  
	  
A	  more	  careful	  assessment	  of	  benefits	  and	  costs	  reveals	  that	  mandated	  
disclosure	  has	  unappreciated	  costs	  that	  are	  hard	  to	  measure	  and	  substantial	  enough	  to	  
undermine	  the	  enterprise.	  Disclosures	  work	  (in	  theory)	  if	  people	  pay	  attention	  to	  them.	  
Attention	  is	  a	  scarce	  resource,	  and	  thus	  at	  best	  only	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  disclosures	  
could	  work.	  When	  the	  number	  of	  disclosures	  mandated	  exceeds	  this	  optimal	  level,	  
additional	  disclosures	  do	  not	  increase,	  and	  may	  even	  reduce,	  the	  attention	  discloses	  pay	  
to	  disclosures.	  	  	  
	  
What	  are	  the	  lessons	  of	  disclosure	  regulation	  to	  the	  general	  enterprise	  of	  cost-­‐
benefit	  analysis	  in	  financial	  regulation?	  The	  risk	  we	  identified	  is	  “tunnel	  vision”—a	  
narrow	  perspective	  that	  encourages	  regulators	  to	  exaggerate	  the	  benefits	  of	  a	  proposed	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regulation.	  Tunnel	  vision	  comes	  from	  the	  ways	  a	  regulation	  may	  interact	  with	  other	  
regulations,	  including	  those	  issued	  by	  other	  federal,	  state,	  and	  local	  agencies.	  These	  
interactions	  underscore	  the	  benefits	  of	  having	  a	  coordinator	  like	  OIRA—the	  White	  
House	  Office	  of	  Information	  and	  Regulatory	  Affairs.	  OIRA	  reviews	  regulation	  from	  
different	  agencies	  and	  can	  be	  a	  repository	  of	  institutional	  knowledge	  and	  of	  
coordination.	  It	  can	  guide	  regulators	  and	  discourage	  them	  from	  going	  down	  blind	  alleys	  
and	  reproducing	  old	  errors.	  OIRA	  might	  not	  be	  able	  to	  overcome	  the	  excessive	  
accumulation	  of	  legislative	  disclosure	  mandates,	  but	  it	  can	  teach	  the	  limited	  utility	  of	  
disclosure	  in	  today’s	  regulatory	  landscape.	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